In preparing for this talk, I studied the discourse structure for presidential addresses to see what one is supposed to do. The following rule emerged as the first rule for an address generator: presAddr visionaryStatemant uwaboutyourpesearch So, I first have some thoughts to offer aaout the computer revolution and the role we psychologists with computer training ought to play. After that, I'll turn my attention to some work I have been doing on the acquisition of complex skills, an endeavor in which people and machines now compete.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMPUTER REVOLUTION FOR PSYCHOLOGY
It is almost a cliché by now to proclaim that we are about to undergo a socioeconomic revolution in which information will be a major item of trade and will be This address reports work supported by the Office of Naval Research Personnel and Training Group, the National Institute of Education, and the Air Force Human Resource' LaboratorY- The research results all come from collaborations with Bcb Glaser, Dale Klopfer, Harriet Rubinson, Paul Feltovieh. Carol White, Lloyd Bond, Lauren Resnick, Kathleen Hammond, Christopher Roth, and other LIWC colleagues. I take complete responsibility for the assertinus made in this paper, with which neither sponsors nor collaborators necessarily agree, but the work would have been impossible without them. My mailing address is: Learning Research and Development Center, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 13260 . packaged in small containers, not human heads. Indeed, for the members of this Society, who have relied on computer software for many aspects of their work, the revolution is almost at hand. At least a few of us-have been in positions in which what we needed most was a particular software system, not a human assistant or a piece of hardware. The computer has changed our lives in a manner reminiscent of the effects of the printing press or the steam engine. As students of human behavior and cognition, surely we need to attend to the effects of the computer on our fellow human beings, too. Indeed, the problems we pick to study will be driven by the needs of society as always, and society now needs to understand and prepare for the computer revolution.
Some effects of widespread computer usage are now painfully apparent. Many factory workers ate being replaced by robots, and others are finding their skills devalued as they compete with robots. I am concerned in this presentation, though, with a second displacement that is also beginning, in the white-collar work force. Many routine jobs were necessary to the tunning . of large-scale companies but were also a cause of overly complex management structures. Competitive companies will pin greatly by trimming management positions, especially those that contribute information processing skill only at the expense of introducing further layers of authority into the management hierarchy. People who thought they were set for life will be out of work and in need of mtraining.
Obviously, there will be Luddite reactions to these events, and thus the effects of the computer revolution Cc.Tyr-iPt Psychonomlc S42_ cieiy, Ince _ will be slowed slightly. However, the changes I just mentioned are already starting to happen, and we can make an important contribution by studying issues related to training of valued workers for the computer age.
This concern has motivated much of the research my These are exactly the jobs most likely to be automated away. The dilemma I see is that those least able to learn from inadequate instruction will be most likely to have to undergo su,:a instruction frequently, as they move from one job to another under chase from automation. This suggests that efforts to improve instruction and training in order to assist poor learners will be worthwhile.' It also suggests that we might devote resources to research on the skills of learning and on efforts to teach those skills. A panel that Fred Reif and I chaired has recently published recommendations for federally funded research on possible roles for intelligent computer systems in solving these problems (Lesgold & Reif, 1983) .
Automation destroys apprenticeship opportunities.
Most knowledge is acquired after a combination of learning by being told and learning through practice. One solution for those who have trouble learning from lectures is the apprenticeship, in which learning is gradual and combined with practice. The apprentice starts with the simplest chores and gradually is allowed to assume more and more of the range of. performances that characterize expert or master status. Unfortunately, progress in building intelligent computer systems also proceeds from the simple to the complex. In many skill areas, soMe of the apprenticeship opportunities are being destroyed by advancing automation.
One example involves the training of electronics technicians. Once, technicians did serious problem solving from the first day they were on the job. They had to understand how the devices they were servicing worked and how to diagnose them, and this understanding was reinforced by regular opportunities to solve problems. Today, new technicians are, prevented from having many of the learning experiences that were once possible. Human expertise, in contrast, is often more flexible, more capable of transfer to new situations. We need to understand this flexibility and find ways to build it in the course of training people in skills. We need to emphasize transfer in our studies of learning. Skills may not lead to virtues. Finally, we must recognize that cognitive psychology is generally ignoring an area in which machines are least likely to tread. Machines will acquire intellectual skills; it is less likely that they will acquire certain social skills and virtues. When we glibly say that automation leads to expansion of the service sector of our economy, we are ignoring the extent to which interpersonal skills may be more important to an average person in an automated society than modest intelligence. 4 look at our governmental institutions and at the problems of our larger businesses quickly tells us that research on leadership skills and on collaboration skills is sorely needed. Perhaps as computer scientists learn to build parallel system architectures in which multiple intelligent entities work together, they can spin off a few metaphors to energize new work on social skill and its acquisition. After all, a few computer metaphors drove cognitive psychology a long way.
Computer tools will allow us to do such work. As psychologists who are a bit ahead of the pack in adapting to the availability of computer assistance, we are the people who should be pioneering work on these problems. We now have computer tools that allow us to study learning and thinking on an appropriate scale.
Intelligent machine extensions of our theoretical reasoning and mental modeling, capabilities, databue systems, and graphics tools, among others, make it possible for us to. attempt to do good science that is also relevant to serious social concerns. This Society exists largely to promote the use of such tools, 'hopefully in research 6 COMPLEX SKILLS AND THEIR ACQUISITION IN A COMPUTERIZED SOCIETY 81 that can eventually help humankind learn to live in automated settings.
ACQUIRING EXPERTISE IN COMPLEX DOMAINS
Continuing to follow the structure I mentioned at the beginning of this talk, it's now time to remove the mitre and put on the lab coat. I want to talk about some research on the acquisition of radiological skill and then briefly about an approach to studying learning that I think is very promising. This work relates to the point I just made about the need to understand expert flexibility and how it is acquired.
Radiological Expertise
In the last few years, several colleagues and I have been trying to understand how the skill of radiological diagnosis is acquired (Lesgold, 1983a; Lesgold, Feltovich, Glaser, & Wang, 1981) . Radiology was chosen for two important reasons. First, it requires the ability to access a complex mental representation (of a patiehes innards) in response to highly ambiguous visual displays and the ability to tune that representation to specific cases.
Second, it involves several domains of knowledge that have very complex interfaces. Visual patterns learned by prototype learning do not map cleanly onto disease variations; often two examples of the same diseue look more different than two examples of different diseases.
Similarly, the interrelationships among structural anatomy, the physiology of normal function, and the nature of disease are also complex. To the knowledge engineer, it looks like thousands of separate rules are required to capture such a skill. However, having only such a large and cumbersome rule set would leave an expert with very brittle knowledge, knowledge that does not adapt readily to new situations. We were interested in the general flexibility of radiological expertise as well as specific diagnostic knowledge.
I can't provide a complete account of thir work in this talk. Rather, I want to present a few highlights, in the form of assertions presented with snippets of the empiricad support we have seen for them. The empirical support comes from two sources. First, we have conducted a naturalistic study of expert and resident radiologists, in which we took verbal protocols as they performed a slightly modified version of the diagnosis work that constitutes much of their daily activity (see Lesgold et al., 1981 , for details). We later conducted modified study in which we tried to ver14, what subjects were seeing In our test films by having them draw on the film itself. This way, they could indicate what they were seeing in the film. We also prompted them to draw structures tbat pilot work had shown were sources of possible skill differences. Here ere a few of out conclusions.
The forest-trees problem.
Novices hese difficulty constructing representations in which the same stimulus feature is mapped onto two different obiectL
The first asserton is a variation on the old problem of not being able to see the forest for the trees. We have strong evidence that radiology residents can only assign a particular region of an x-ray film to one piece of stnicture. As a result, they often misapprehend the true shape of abnormalities. In some cases, surrounding structures "recruit" parts of the film that also include an abnormality. This makes the abnormality seem smaller than it really is, leading to misdiagnosis. In other cases, abnormal regions grow by recruiting normal regions they abut. We saw both phenomena in the drawings and verbal protocols of our subjects.
A particularly nice example comes from a film showing a collapse of the middle lobe of the right lung. This filth showed a large, sail-shaped wedge in the part of the lung that is near the heart (the wedge is produced by the increased density of the lung material after it collapses). Unfortunately, even though this pattern is a relatively common variant of the classic pattern displayed by such a collapse, not every instance of the pattern is caused by collapse. Certain tumors and several other disorders can produce the same appearance. In fact, our residents sometimes intetpreted the sail-shaped region in a way that precluded a conclusion of collapsed lung. Figure 1 shows overlaid tracings of the sail-shaped region drawn by several expert and resident subjects. The experts saw a region bounded by the pulmonary artery, and it was the right size to be considered as a collapsed lung. In fact, they only saw a small collateral of the artery as actually entering the region of high density. The residents tended to follow various bits of noise and to recruit much of the critical region into their representation of the pulmonary artery, leaving Flow 1. Overlakl many of the selehapal mita dawn by avail expeite aid several naidena. very little to be an unaccounted-for abnormality. They were incapable of seeing both blood vessel ami some other density in the same space. Left with a small mass to explain, they tended to call it a tumor. In capsule summary, residents have not yet formed the automatic and complex recognition skilis that would keep diagnoses like these from becoming embedded-figures tests in which the Gestalt laws of general stimulus organization play a bigger role than recognition for specific features.
The don't-bother-me-Pm-busy problem.
Experts are opportunistic planners. They have rich, flexible disease schemata. In contrast, novices have classic, less tunable schemata and are more lik?ly to maintain bad film interpretations in the face of discrepant evidence from the patient's clinical histm.
This second broad assertion could itself bs the topic of an hour or two of discussion. Instead, I will present only some hints of what the data we have been gathering suggest. First, there is the issue of schema flexibility. Earlier, I discussed the issue of flexibility versus brittleness in expertise. Our experts showed a number of examples of flexibility in their diagnoses. They were fast because they were able to quickly recognize general film features that could trigger an appropriate schema to guide further viewing, a matter I'll turn to shortly. On the other hand, when some aspect of what they saw conflicted with the invoked schema, they were able to tune the schema or abandon it, as appropriate. Table 1 provides some protocol extracts for an expert who showed this capability. The case concerned a patient who was currently healthy but whose right upper lung lobe had been removed a decade earlier. Because.organs shifted to fill the space left over from the missing lung lobe, the film had many abnormal featuresthings in the wrong place, densities that were unusuaL The film seems to show a collapsed lung, when actually the lung lobe was surgically removed. Even some experts were fooled and tended to diagnose the patient as having a disease-induced lung collapse. Most residents reached a similar conclusion, althcugh some concluded that the patient had congestive heart failure. However, one expert put an a virtuoso performance.
Almost immediately after his 2-sec first look at the film, the expert drew a conclusion that many subjects failed to reach. He decided that the film showed a chronic problem. one that did not suddenly appear. He then tried to fmd an appropriate schema into which he could fit what he was seeing. To make schemata fit, he tried applying rotational transformations, considering the possibility that the subject had not been facing directly toward the x-ray plate. However, that didn't help. Finally, he began to let the collapsed-lung schema guide his thinking.
However, he didn't just accept that schema; he kept trying to both test and -elaborate it. Soon, he noticed the irregularities of some ribs that had been broken a decade ago by the surgeon. He then very quickly changed schemata and cracked the case. Even then, though, he kept testing his new conclusion and seeking a hybrid of the collapse and lobectomy schemata. This was quite reasonable, since a collapse of a lobe has many of the same long-term effects as removal of a lobe.
Throughout, the expert displayed flexibility, the ability to push, tune, and retreat from a schema that was guiding his thinking. In contrast, some residents held to their pessimistic diagnoses of congestive heart failure even after we told them that the patient was perfectly well, had had a similar-appearing film done a year ago, and had had a lobectomy performed long ago. They still said she had heart failure, even though we had just told them she felt fine. They seemed unable to test the schemata or the specific hypotheses they had invoked or to take account of new data we provided.
Does learning always mean improvemmt?
Trainee performance in nonclassical cases may not vary monotonically with &valence. This is because the tuning of diagnostic schemata both tmproves their potential accuracy and temporarily increases the conscious processing load they imPose. Table 2 shows another finding, one a bit more surprising for us. Our aaturalistic studies involved films that were quite difficult. Indeed, it is close to impossible to make an absolutely definite diagnosis from some of our Mins without additional data. With several of these Table I Expert Diagnostic Performance Sontethlog Li mon& and It's chronic: 'We may be dealing with a chronic process here .... hying to get a When!: "I'm trying to work out why the medlasdnum and the heart is displaced into the iight chest. There is not enough rotation to account for this. I don't see displacement of fissures.
Experinvents steth collapse sehenw: 'There may be a collapse of the riaht lower lobe but the diaphragm on the right side is well vitualized and that's a feature against it . Does wine taring scheme doesn't flt without a tot of tuning: "I come back to the right chest. The ribs are crowded together The crowding of thc rib cage can, en some occasions, be due to previous surgery. In fact, ... the thir4 and fourth ribs We narrow and irregular so he's probably had previous surgery .... Decks the case: "He's probably had one of his lobes resected. It wouldn't be the middle lobe. It may be the upper lobe. It may not necessarily be a lobectomy. It could be a small segment of the lung with pleural thickening at the back.
Cheeks to be swe: "I don't see the right hilum films, we noticed that subjects with 3 or 4 years of training did worse than lst-and 2nd-year residents;
performance was not a monotone function of training. Now, we had only 23 subjects in this study and only 10 films, so this finding should be treated as very tentative. Indeed, our efforts to replicate it in the training research I will discuss in a moment have thus far produced plateaus but not revarsals. However, the finding is consistent with a view of skill acquisition that I happen to like, io I will press on. The interpretation we have been toying with in our research group2 is that the apparent accuracy reversal is due to a progression from probabilistic to reasonsupported decision making. New residents learn classic schemata first. When they examine a film, they try to fit it to a schema they have already learned. Generally, this is equivalent to making the high-probability guess for a set of noticed surface features. As they become more skilled, they are able to do deeper analyses of the feature details that do not quite fit the classic schema decision making becomes more rational and complete.
However, until they become more proficient at this deeper level of analysis, they make errors, perhaps even more than would be made by simply picking the highprobability bet based on a few features. This analysis would lead us to expect a nonmonotone relationship between experience and accuracy for more complex films.
Planning: Knowing where to look and what to see.
The precise, rapid recognition skill that characterizes apertin involves interactions between higher and lower processes. It is not purely top-down or bottomup.
Experts recognize constraints on problem solution early but defer decisions until they ate necessary.
Again, I've made a very broad claim, and we have only begun to gather an appropriate range of data. Let me present three bits of data that help to support the assertions rve just made. First, I want to show you more evidence that expertise involves more rapid shaping of diagnostic behavior by a preliminaty schema. The data I've already presented alio showed related effects. Second, I will show you evidence that such schemata are triggered very early, even in the first 2 sec of viewing.
Third, I'll show you evidence that experts know where in the film to look. Schemata triggered during the first seconds of scanning a film guide their Subsequent search of the film.
The first piece of data is in Table 3 . For a film involving chronic lung disease, we tabulated the proportion of subjects in each condition who mentioned fmdings that were either consistent or inconsistent with a chronic lung disease schema. As you can see from the table, the consistent fmdings were more probable in experts' protocols, and mention of some fmdings that are netltral or inconsistent with the chronic lung disease schema was more frequent for residents. Now, you may wonder about an M.D. with an internship who says the hilar area is overly prominent when it is actually less prominent than usual. The second piece of relevant data is meant to show that schemata are triggered earlier in experts. We looked at protocols from another chronic lung disease case (not the same one as in the previous figure) and tabulated the frequency with which various schema-consistent features were mentioned after seeing the film for only 2 sec. As you can see from Table 4 , experts were more likely to report these features after only 2 sec than were residents; indeed, they seldom failed to report any of the four features listed. Even in a final diagnosis after extensive viewing, the residents are not all that likely to include chronic lung disease in their diagnoses.
The third piece of relevant data is meant to show that schemata help determine which film regions the expert will examine further. Our collapsed-lung film had many general sips of chronic lung disuse along with the signs of collapse. One clear indication of schema-driven and ascribing of features, to be concentrated in the lungs. Table 5 shows that, for experts, almost all reports of things seen, normal or abnormal, were about the lungs and the pleurae (which are the sacs that surround the lungs). In contrast, residents actually talked more about nonlung observations than about the lungs themselves. Again, we see that expertise involves procedures that are schema driven. Of course, when the schema is inadequate, or overly classic, experts also are able to patch it, to tailor a generic set of procedures to the case at hand.
The Need for Longitudinal Research on Training I view the radiology work as an accommodation of a perceptually driven domain into a scheme that other researchers bad already proposed. We've said a few things that 1111) new about expertise, but we've mainly shown how previous findings by others could be extended to a very different domain. What we're now trying to do is to go beyond studying expertise to studying its acquisition. Thus, we've created an artificial domain in which the films are based upon a computer model and a replicable and controllable set of abnormal perturbations are performed to produce films of "disease."
Pseudo-x-ray training studies. Figure 2 shows an example of a film that we're calling "normal," and Figure 3 shows our vetsion of a collapsed lung. The severity of the "dimes", we =ploy it varied by using a numerical parameter to determine the extent of a perturbation. For example, a raised diaphragm on the patient's right side (viewer's left side) is one symptom of collapsed right middle lobe. We simply make the extent of perturbation of the diaphragm froth its normal location a function of the severity parameter. Basically, the computer model has a "political" map of the chest showing organ boundaries and a "physical" map of the chest showing the gray levels those organs project onto an x-ray film. The levels are approximately authentic, but medical authenticity ir irrelevant to our experimental approach. A "disease" is manufActured by specifying a set of features, where each feature is a distortion of either a boundary in the "political" map. a density level in the "physical" map, =A both. The exact shape of a perturbation, and the way in which density levels are represented by combinations of black and white dots, is randomly varied over instances of the film types. In addition, we can vary "exposure" by multiplying all the density values by a constant. The programs that develop tiles of graphics commands for these stimuli are simple and relatively short FORMAN programs. ' We've now given a group of college students extensive training in recognizing four different pseudodiseases in these pseudo-x-ray pictures. They've thus far had about as many hours with us as they would get in a two-credit coursenot expert-level training, but much more than the usual learning experiment. Some have .
been taught mechanistic explanations for the four diseases and the film features that signal them, whereas others have only been taught the physical features to watch for. In the training, we ask them to mention any disease features they see in a film, and after each diagnosis, we ask them to tell us which features were key sources for their decisions.
We are trying to understand the retention and transfer effects of the two forms of training, which tend, in the short term, to produce approximately equal recog-BEST COPY AVAILABLE COMPLEX SKILLS AND THEIR ACQUISITION IN A COMPUTERIZED SOCIETY 85 nition accuracy. There are some differences that are already apparent. For example, there is an apparent tendency for deep knowledge about our pseudodiseases to result in somewhat more likelihood of noticing features that are central to an explanation of the physical dynamics of a disease and somewhat less likelihood of r_lentioning features that are, in my opinion, especially physically salient but not reflective of an immediate effect of the basic physical disease mechanism. This is strikingly close to the sort of schema-driven processing effect we got in the studies I just told you about.
The real payoff, I think, is just beginning to appear from this sort of research. We can trace the longitudinal pattern of sensitivity to specific features in different films. For example, Figure 4 shows a matrix of all the features mentioned for a specific type of fdm over all its occurrences in the course of 8 days of 1-h/day training. The rows represent the instances of the film type being presented', from first to last. The coluiins represent specific features that were mentioned. features MI, M4. and A6 were present from the beginning, but that it took some time for the subject to learn to notice P1M5 and P2M2, which were also found in embolism films. Figure 5 , in contrast, shows an example of seeing stuff the isn't there, A features in an E film, during the rust days of learning. We are just starting to look at this sort of longitudinal data.
Since we can control the relationship between the features we put into our pseudodiseaas and what the subject is taught about them, we have the basis for quite a range of longitudinal studies of the effects of theoretical versus more practically specific forms of instruction on recognition and diagnosis. When the possibilities of both near transfer, to milder forms of a disease,, and far transfer, to the same disease in different loci (e.g., collapse of different lungs), are considered, it is apparent that this paradigm should be very helpful in studying the effects of different forms of training.
As a methodologically driven organization, I think it is important to be sensitive to the role the computer has played in making such research possible. The mass of data from our longitudinal studies requires a database system. The stimuli are computer generated, and it would be impractical to do them by hand. The modeling work that has led to this whole domain of research rests on a variety of tools developed by artificial intelligence researchers and psychologists who interact with them. It is almost a clichi for a scientist to say that his ability to see a bit further is due to his standing on the shoulden of giants. It seems that we're now able to find both human and machine giants to give us a boost.
Reading skill. With these new tools, I argue that we must start to do studies on the scale that matches the kinds of learning that are important in our society. Just as the physicist sometimes requires a Fermfiab or a tokamak to study basic physical forces, so we must be prepared to scale up our experiments to study learning that takes place over hours, days, even months and years. We have the ability to conduct extensive apedments with computer-controlled conditions and com- For decades, debate has raged over how to teach reading. Designers of basal reading series argue that one should emphasize reading as language, quickly getting children to read whole texts that are meaningful, teaching words as holistic recognition units. Others argue that children should concentrate on learning the basic spelling patterns of which words are composed, so that they can "sound out" a word that they haven't seen in print but may recognize in speech. The issue is even political, with conservatives favoring phonics more often than liberals do. There are a few data, but not many. A couple of decade: ago, phonics-ricn programs had a slight edge in levels of reading test scores they produced. However, teachers select curricula, so there are all sorts of confounding: of curriculum with teacher qualities, especially in the period when the original research was done, a period during which use of phonics was somewhat restricted to tough, no-nonsense teachers. Lauren Resnick and I decided a number of years ago that the way to settle some of these issues was to watch the changes in word processing skills and overall reading ability as children advanced through the primary grades. We designed a longitudinal study that followed children through the primary grades in one school that had a phonics program and another that used a standard basal program. We've published some of our fmdings (Lessold & Resnick, 1982) , and mole will be out soon. Today, I can only give you a very brief sense of the use of the longitudinal approach.
We were able to do correlations and various forms of path analysis among the many measures we took, with each measure made at several points in time, on the same subjects. These measums allowed us to corclude, for example, that in both basal and phonics-loaded programs, facility in word recognition is au important precursor of later reading comprehension facility. This supports the idea that general skills of word recognition, u opposed to recognition for lots of separate words only, are important On the-other hand, by second grade, and certainly by third grade, the best predictor of reading success later an is current reading comprehension ability, not word automaticity. There is no evidence that those who are behind in reading should be relegated to phonics drill instead of reading sensible text. The general pattern of our data is that word processing facility provides a boost early in the course of training. We suspect that word recognition practice could be odd later if it can be provided without prejudice to time spent on serious discourse processing. 4 We also were able to trace many of the effects of different forms of instruction. For example, students in the basal classrooms initially were faster at oral reading.
We think this is because they didn't have any timedemanding strategies for sounding out words that they didn't know. However, by third grade, there were no striking differences either in reading speed or in performance on comprehension tests. Further, both groups showed the same general pattern of early word recognition facility's predicting later comprehension skill. We continue to examine the data for evidence that sptcific children require one kind of training or another: This is where differences in curricular success are likely to appear.
What Resnick and I did not do was was to collect sufficiently rich qualitative data on the development of reading skill; at least we have yet to analyze or report any (we do have some preliminary indications that qualitative modeling of the pause stmctum of early oral reading may be interesting). What I am suggesting today is that we begin to commit ourselves to longer term, richer studies of the course of learning. I think that we will need broader and more refmed knowledge of how flexible. extensible skill is acquired if we are to make the same progress in improving human opportunities for intelligent activity as has occurred in research on machine intelligence. Even though such research requires complex computer tools and teams of researchers, we must attempt it.
NEW STYLES OF RESEARCH
This Society has an important role to play in matching the scale of research to the problems for which experimental psychologists can provide solutions. As computer networks, more powerful machines, and artificial intelligence tools appear, we will be capable of conducting studies whose time scale and complexity match that of human learning. By doing so, we can match the new theoretical power of cognitive psychology with the empirical basis that can preserve it as a science. My experience is that this requires more collaborative efforts, and perhaps more interdisciplinary efforts, than were once the case for our field. Nothing rye reported would have been possible had I tried to do it myself, even in the rich computer environment available to me. Fortunately, I've had colleagues skilled both in their disciplines and in the social &Ms of collaboration. Someday, perhaps we'll understand how to help people acquire both kinds of skill.
